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I. Introduction
The subprime mortgage market turbulence in the summer of 2007 was characterized by sharp drops in asset prices, increasing volatility and episodes of liquidity dry-ups. Most of the literature focuses on the dramatic reactions of the stock and bond markets. However, the crisis has been systematic from its very beginning and has severely affected the foreign exchange (FX) market. Indeed, Melvin and Taylor (2009) extensively document the large losses in currency trading strategies, especially the carry trade, from August 2007. They also show that the dynamics of currency bid-ask spreads during the crisis were largely affected by factors originating outside the FX market. The literature has established returns and volatility linkages between currencies and stocks, but the illiquidity linkage has received little attention.
In this paper, I investigate the illiquidity channel linking currencies and stocks.
Illiquidity is a broad concept that comprises different aspects. I focus on bid-ask spreads and study how shocks to transaction costs are transmitted across markets and what factors may trigger these dynamics. Understanding illiquidity dynamics is especially important when liquidity is scarce. Indeed, a large body of literature emerged following the recent financial crisis to study illiquidity and identify its determinants (e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009 ).
I follow the literature and analyze illiquidity dynamics during the recent financial crisis . Moreover, I investigate whether these dynamics are exclusive of this crisis or they are common in market turbulence, focusing on two other episodes: the dotcom crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis .
The cross-market linkages between stock and currency returns originate from a variety of factors. For instance, commonality in stocks and currencies may originate from international investors rebalancing their portfolios (e.g., Hau and Rey 2005; Hau, Massa and Peress 2010) .
Moreover, popular trading strategies link the two markets. For instance, "global macro" and "multistrategy" are strategies that involve simultaneous trading in stocks and currencies. 2 Additionally, arbitrageurs may exploit price mismatches between cross-listed stocks. There is evidence of co-movement between FX and stock liquidity (Mancini, Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer 2013; Karnaukh, Ranaldo and Söderlind 2015) . To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first investigation of the dynamics of the illiquidity mechanisms linking stocks and currencies, with particular attention to illiquidity spirals. The focus is on the NASDAQ and the major FX electronic trading platforms (Reuters and EBS). These segments are representative of significant portions of trading in stocks and currencies and share important similarities in their structure (see Section II).
The identification of the illiquidity channel linking stocks and currencies is relevant in different respects. As a measure of frictions, illiquidity affects market efficiency. Hence, the identification of interdependencies in the illiquidity of financial markets contributes to the understanding of the processes towards market efficiency (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam 2008) . Furthermore, the presence of illiquidity spillovers across markets has implications for asset management. Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) find a significant correlation between the returns of trading strategies in stocks and currencies, determined by their exposure to liquidity risk. In addition, liquidity risk is priced in the cross-section of both asset returns (Pastor and Stambaugh 2003; Banti, Phylaktis and Sarno 2012) . Thus understanding the sources of these linkages is relevant for asset pricing. The systemic dimension of liquidity also has important policy implications, given the severe costs and negative externalities associated with its sudden dry-ups. These have been particularly severe during the recent financial crisis.
I identify cross-market illiquidity dynamics between stocks and currencies by conducting a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis of daily transaction costs from 1999 to 2014. The observed illiquidity linkages depend on certain asset characteristics. In particular, I
find that, during the recent financial crisis, stocks of smaller firms (also called small caps) are more strongly related to currencies than stocks of larger firms (large caps). In turn, I find that the relationship between the illiquidity of currencies and small caps depends on currencies' role in the carry trade. The carry trade is a popular leveraged cross-currency trading strategy that involves borrowing in low-yield currencies (so-called funding currencies) to invest in highyield currencies (so-called investment currencies). In this respect, I find that investment currencies are more intertwined with small caps than funding currencies. Interestingly, small caps and investment currencies are also relatively more vulnerable to shifts in the availability and costs of external financing for dealers or traders, the so-called funding constraints. An influential study by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) identifies the key dynamics between market liquidity and funding constraints. Albeit to different degrees depending on the venue, dealers are important liquidity providers in financial markets, and they rely on external financing to operate. When financing availability is low as in a crisis, increasing global risk and risk aversion may trigger greater capital requirements (or haircut, i.e., the difference between the value of a security and the collateral, financed with dealers' own capital) and margin calls (i.e., requests by financiers for additional collateral to secure financing). These funding shocks may force dealers to cut down their liquidity supply in all of the markets in which they operate. Small caps that are more volatile and less liquid than large caps on average are also more capital-intensive and exposed to margin calls. According to Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen 2008, investment currencies are sensitive to crash risk, that is, the risk of a sudden unwinding of carry trade positions by funding-constrained traders. Hence, their exposure to funding constraints coupled with severe distress in funding markets may explain the linkage between small caps and investment currencies during the recent financial crisis. However, this finding cannot be generalized to other crisis episodes. Indeed, I find greater illiquidity linkages between stocks and funding currencies during the dotcom crisis, whereas I find no clear pattern in the analysis of the European sovereign debt crisis.
To clarify these findings, I explicitly investigate the role of the supply and demand side factors identified in the literature. In addition to dealers' liquidity supply, I consider the role of the demand for liquidity by institutional investors (e.g., Kamara, Lou and Sadka 2008) . I find that the behavior of these key market players implies that shifts in funding constraints and institutional correlated trading may dry up systemic liquidity, providing empirical evidence for the theoretical models of illiquidity spirals by Pedersen (2009) and Acharya and Viswanathan (2011) . An illiquidity shock in one market may lead to a higher liquidity demand by institutional investors, in addition to lower liquidity provision by fundingconstrained dealers. These reactions may trigger further illiquidity shocks, precipitating illiquidity spirals. Importantly, I show that the role of currencies in such events is not uniform across crises. Illiquidity spirals are a feature of investment currencies during the recent financial crisis, but they mostly relate to funding currencies during the dotcom bubble crisis.
This suggests different mechanisms at work. During the dotcom bubble, carry traders were only starting to build up their positions after the 1998 crisis (Galati and Melvin 2004) . The liquid and less risky funding currencies are generally used in short-term money markets.
Hence, an illiquidity shock to this set of currencies may impair funding markets and lead to tighter funding constraints (Mancini, Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer 2013) . Conversely, traders held large carry positions at the onset of the recent financial crisis (Hattori and Shin 2009 ).
Liquidation of these positions resulted in dramatic unwinding episodes (Melvin and Taylor 2009 ). The subsequent price pressure on investment currencies may have caused illiquidity problems in the presence of funding constraints (Plantin and Shin 2014) . Indeed, given their riskiness, illiquidity shocks to investment currencies may fuel expectations of further losses on carry trades (Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen 2008) . As the credit risk of leveraged carry traders worsens, banks may curtail funding further, triggering an illiquidity spiral. Finally, there is no evidence of illiquidity spirals across markets during the European debt crisis. At this time, "official" liquidity provision from the policy responses to the previous financial crisis may have reduced the impact of "private" funding constraints. Along these lines, I document that illiquidity is responsive to unexpected changes in US monetary policy, especially stocks.
II. The Institutional Framework
The FX market is characterized by a variety of trading venues. Due to data availability, I focus on trading activity in the major currency pairs that occurs on the largest FX electronic platforms (Reuters and EBS). These account for $738bn of the $5.3tn average daily turnover in the global FX market (BIS 2013). These trading platforms operate with automatic order matching. The NASDAQ is a centralized electronic market with the automatic execution of trades. Although historically quote-driven, it has features of an order-driven market (i.e., it displays all bid and ask quotes) with the presence of market makers for the sample period of this study.
Despite the changes in the composition of traders over time, dealers play an important role in both markets. On the NASDAQ, dealers, or market makers, are required to post quotes on both sides (bid and ask). Because they are not required to post inside the spread, the aggressiveness of their quotes, and their liquidity provision, varies across time and stocks (Chung and Zhao 2004) . As a multi-dealer market, each stock has 17 registered dealers on average (NASDAQ website). Dealers are not the sole liquidity providers, and they are subject to competition from their customers' limit orders (which they are required to post and execute before their proprietary orders) and from electronic communication networks (ECNs) . ECNs are open-limit order books that can connect directly to the NASDAQ network and account for a large share of trading (40% of trading in 2002 according to Hendershott (2003) (Rime and Schrimpf 2013) . These institutions include institutional investors (such as mutual funds and pension funds) and hedge funds, each accounting for 11% of trading in April 2013 (BIS 2013) .
3 Moreover, in both markets, changes in the market structure and technology have encouraged the development of high-frequency trading and have led to a decline in transaction costs over time.
Differences in regulation are also noteworthy. The FX market is unregulated, whereas the NASDAQ falls under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) framework.
Indeed, behaviors and practices that are illegal in the NASDAQ may be discouraged by conventions and best practices but are nevertheless legal in the FX market (King, Osler and Rime 2012) . It is important to note that the unregulated nature of the FX market is currently being challenged by the regulatory responses to the recent scandals in currency trading.
4

III. Data
Measuring Illiquidity: Transaction Costs
Liquidity is a broad concept. It generally relates to the ease of placing large trades quickly and at low cost. Although several measures have been developed to study liquidity in the stock market, limitations on data availability have restricted the number of proxies employed in the analysis of the FX market. In this study, I estimate illiquidity in the two markets by their 3 Even if unable to trade directly on these platforms, financial institutions traded with dealers in the costumer-dealer segment of the FX market for the first part of the sample period of this work and, in part, throughout the entire sample. Thus, their presence and trading activity affect the dynamics of interdealer trading. For a model of FX trading across segments, see Lyons (1997) . 4 The FEMR of the Bank of England has issued a consultation document on this issue that was presented by Deputy Governor Sharik during a speech at the LSE on October 27, 2014. transaction costs. 5 As a result, I restrict the definition of illiquidity to the cost of obtaining immediacy (Demsetz 1968) . I measure transaction costs by the percentage bid-ask spreads, that is, the difference of ask and bid prices scaled by the mid. Doing so improves comparability across stocks and currencies.
The stock market dataset comprises the bid and ask quotes of NASDAQ ordinary common shares (CRSP share code 10 or 11) for the sample period of 1999 to 2014. 6 The ask and bid are the closing inside quotes (highest bid and lowest ask) for each trading day, where closing time is 16:00 EST. 7 The data are from CRSP and are adjusted for errors and outliers.
In detail, when the value of the spread is zero or the percentage spread is higher than half the mid-price in any given year, I exclude the quotes from the dataset in that year. Additionally, when the stock price in any year is higher than $999, I exclude the stock from the analysis to avoid extremely large share prices that would drive the measures. These omissions are in line with the adjustments performed by Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) and Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010) . To build the measures, I sort stocks according to their market capitalization at the beginning of each year and divide them into five groups, with the first group containing smaller cap stocks and the fifth containing larger cap stocks. I then calculate the individual illiquidity measures for each market capitalization quintile as the cross-sectional average of the bid-ask spreads in the group. In the analysis, I focus on the illiquidity of the smallest and largest market capitalization quintiles because the two groups are characterized by important differences. On one hand, trading in small caps is more capital-intensive and sensitive to changes in financing availability (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009 ). On the other 5 In particular, I do not rely on the widely used Amihud measure due to lack of trading volume data for FX. 6 In unreported robustness tests, I consider the illiquidity of common stocks trading on the NYSE and confirm the main findings. 7 For a similar period, Chung and Zhang (2014) show that NASDAQ spreads calculated with CRSP daily data are highly correlated, at over 90%, with high-frequency TAQ spreads.
hand, large caps are largely held by institutional investors that rely on their liquidity for deleveraging during market downturns (Kamara, Lou and Sadka 2008) .
The FX market dataset includes ask and bid prices of the USD against the Australian dollar (AUD), Euro (EUR), British pound (GBP), Japanese yen (JPY), and Swiss franc (CHF).
Data are from actual trades in a one-minute window around 21:50 GMT ( . Investment currencies in speculators' portfolios are exposed to the risk of the sudden unwinding of carry trades in times of distress, the so-called crash risk (Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen 2008) . This risk is especially relevant in times of distress when traders may be forced to unwind their positions due to greater funding constraints. Along these lines, Mancini, Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer (2013) and Karnaukh, Ranaldo and Söderlind (2015) document the importance of carry trades for the exposure of currencies to volatility and liquidity risk. In particular, they show that investment currencies are more exposed to volatility and liquidity risk than funding currencies. Building on these findings, I
study the exposure and contribution of currencies to illiquidity spirals.
The Determinants of Illiquidity
Following the literature, I identify the potential sources of illiquidity in both markets, focusing on the supply and demand side factors.
Dealers are liquidity suppliers in both the stock and the FX markets. Under certain conditions, when dealers suffer a decline in funding availability, such as increases in capital requirements or margin calls, they may reduce the provision of liquidity to the markets in which they operate (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009; Gromb and Vayanos 2010; Acharya and Viswanathan 2011) . 8 As opposed to stock dealers, currency dealers tend to carry no inventory overnight. During the day, they pass undesired inventory positions among each other (and, most recently, also among other non-dealer financial institutions), the so-called hot potato phenomenon (Lyons 1997) . However, they are affected by inventory considerations when taking up positions during the day. Indeed, they are subject to the risk of not being able to offload them quickly and at low cost, especially during crisis episodes ( Among the factors that affect funding constraints, I consider credit riskiness in the interbank market. The interbank market is a source of unsecured financing and is thus affected by credit risk. To account for other factors that may affect funding constraints, I consider secured financing in a robustness exercise in Section VII. Given the presence of collateral, secured financing captures the changes in financing availability triggered by adverse moves in asset prices and liquidity.
I focus on two financial centers, London and New York, and employ the UK pound and US dollar TED spreads to proxy for funding constraints (Mancini, Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer 2013; Karnaukh, Ranaldo and Söderlind 2015) . New York is especially relevant for funding availability to dealers on the NASDAQ, whereas London is the main platform for trading in FX. Thus, I consider funding conditions in these two financial centers to be representative of the financing constraints faced by dealers in the stock and FX markets. The TED spread is constructed as the 3-month LIBOR over the yield on a generic 3-month government bond. Data are collected from Datastream.
Turning to the demand side, correlated trading by institutional investors (i.e., common buying or selling pressure by these large investors) causes liquidity commonality across stocks (Kamara, Lou, and Sadka 2008; Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk 2012; Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks 2015) . an inflow. In both cases, funds respond by trading more. Thus, I aggregate inflows and outflows towards mutual funds in a measure of institutional correlated trading activity (Coval and 9 Albeit a partial proxy for institutional trading, the data availability on fund flows makes it possible to focus on flow-driven trading (Lou 2012) . Additionally, the defined fund types make it possible to build separate proxies for trading in US equity and FX (as a by-product of investments in foreign equity). Fund flows are also used to proxy for institutional price pressure in Coval and Stafford (2007) .
Stafford 2007; Lou 2012). I focus on US mutual funds with investment objectives in domestic
and foreign equity markets. In particular, I consider the aggregated flows to mutual funds invested in domestic (US) equity as a proxy for institutional trading in the US stock market.
Regarding the foreign equity type, inflows and outflows trigger trading in both the foreign equity market and the related foreign currency (Hau and Rey 2005) . with the FED as the monetary policy proxy (Strongin 1995; Patelis 1997) . The orthogonalized 10 I take the raw flows as opposed to the standardized series (divided by TNA) because the interest is not on the mutual fund industry per se but instead on the effects of fund trading on illiquidity.
non-borrowed reserves are constructed by first normalizing the non-borrowed reserves adjusted for the extended credit by the moving average of the total reserve for 36 months and then storing the residuals from the regression of the normalized non-borrowed reserves on the normalized total reserves. Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the illiquidity measures. As expected, the stock illiquidity level and variability monotonically decrease as market capitalization rises on average. 11 The average returns are positive for the smallest caps and negative for the largest caps, which is consistent with the presence of a liquidity premium in stock returns (Amihud and Mendelson 1986) . Regarding FX, the GBP and the EUR are the most liquid currencies in the sample, whereas the AUD is the least liquid. Overall, the FX market is considerably more liquid than the stock market, with average percentage spreads ranging from 0.03% for the GBP to 0.06% for the AUD, as opposed to a 2.48% for small caps and 0.25% for large caps. All series exhibit a strong autocorrelation. Indeed, illiquidity is persistent, and an illiquid day is likely to be followed by another illiquid day.
Descriptive Statistics
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] To investigate their time-series properties, in Figure I , I plot the illiquidity measures for small and large caps and the AUD and the JPY, which are representative of investment currency and funding currency, respectively. All measures exhibit a decline over time, which is consistent with a steady decrease in transaction costs. However, the illiquidity level sharply increases in both markets during crisis episodes, as marked by the shaded areas in the plots. In [INSERT FIGURE I HERE] Table 2 shows that the illiquidity series are positively correlated. Illiquidity exhibits stronger commonality during the recent financial crisis, especially between the investment currencies and small caps at over 50%. The documented commonality between the series and its variation across crisis episodes are an interesting starting point for a dynamic analysis of illiquidity across the markets.
[
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
IV. The Empirical Model
From the contemporaneous correlation, stock and FX markets share common patterns in terms of illiquidity. To investigate the dynamics of these linkages, I estimate the following VAR model of stock and FX illiquidity:
The VAR includes dummies (seast) to control for the presence of regular patterns in both stock and FX illiquidity, as documented in Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) , Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010) , and Banti and Phylaktis (2015) , and it is estimated with 1 lag according to the Schwarz criterion. 12 I estimate two specifications of the VAR model due to 12 ADF tests show that the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected for all series at the conventional significance level. Thus, I include the series in level and address the trend and weekly and monthly seasonality directly in the VAR (Hamilton 1994 In a robustness exercise, I measure volatility as the 28-day moving average of squared returns and I find qualitatively similar results. Results are unreported for brevity, but they are available from the author upon request. 14 For the sake of brevity, the results are unreported, but they are available from the author upon request. borrowed reserves of depository institutions with the FED. The subscript t indicates months,
given that trading and monetary policy data are available at a monthly frequency. The low number of observations does not allow for a sub-sample analysis; thus, I estimate this specification of the VAR model exclusively for the full sample period.
V. The Cross-Market Dynamics of Illiquidity
Focusing on the first VAR specification at daily frequency, I conduct standard tests on the VAR estimations to identify the illiquidity dynamics across stocks and currencies.
The Full Sample Period
As a preliminary analysis, I estimate the VAR model for the full sample period. For the sake of brevity, the results are unreported, but they are available from the author upon request. If shocks were systemic, then an illiquidity shock in one market would be accompanied by a contemporaneous illiquidity shock in another market. I find that illiquidity shocks are marketspecific events, with correlation coefficients of approximately 2% on average. Granger causality tests show that stock illiquidity is generally informative to predict FX illiquidity.
Moreover, both investment and funding currencies are informative to predict the illiquidity of small caps. Finally, I investigate the dynamics of these illiquidity linkages, employing the Generalized impulse response functions (IRFs) (Koop, Pesaran and Potter 1996; Pesaran and Shin 1998) . I find that illiquidity shocks to both small and large caps result in greater illiquidity in all currencies, whereas only small caps react to FX illiquidity shocks. 
Focus on Crisis Episodes
It is during the latest financial crisis that Melvin and Taylor to cross-market information learning, when investors' risk aversion is high, an illiquidity shock in one market may lead to higher bid-ask spreads in other markets (Cespa and Foucault 2014) .
Hence, I study the illiquidity dynamics and their determinants during crisis periods. Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients of the VAR innovations and the results of the Granger causality tests. There is some evidence of commonality in shocks across stocks and currencies. In detail, during the recent financial crisis, illiquidity shocks present a certain degree of commonality between small caps and investment currencies, with coefficients above 10% (Panel A). During the dotcom crisis (Panel B), there is some commonality between the CHF and stock illiquidity. Indeed, CHF illiquidity shocks are associated with positive illiquidity shocks to large caps (9%) and negative shocks to small caps (-8%). Finally, during the European sovereign debt crisis (Panel C), there is some evidence of commonality between the GBP and stock illiquidity at approximately 6%.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
The Granger causality tests provide some insights into the cross-market linkages.
During the recent financial crisis (Panel A), the illiquidity of small caps is informative in predicting the illiquidity of investment currencies, and vice-versa. During the dotcom crisis (Panel B), the illiquidity of both small and large caps is informative to predict the illiquidity of CHF. Additionally, the illiquidity of funding currencies is informative for the illiquidity of large caps. Finally, the illiquidity of small and large caps significantly predicts the illiquidity of the CHF, the GBP and the JPY in the European sovereign debt crisis (Panel C). Conversely, illiquidity shocks to large caps affect investment currencies and the JPY.
Additionally, when the illiquidity of large caps unexpectedly increases, the illiquidity of the CHF declines. Among currencies, the illiquidity of small caps reacts to illiquidity shocks to the JPY and to a lower extent to the EUR and the GBP.
INSERT FIGURE II HERE]
In conclusion, there is evidence of illiquidity linkages across the two markets. 16 The illiquidity in the stock market affects the illiquidity of all currencies. The exposure of stock illiquidity to FX is restricted to the small caps in the two recent crisis episodes. Moreover, currencies in carry trades have different impact on stocks during the dotcom and the recent financial crises. Investment currencies are relevant in the latter, whereas funding currencies are stronger in the former. To shed light on these findings, I now turn to the potential determinants of liquidity and investigate their impact on the illiquidity dynamics.
VI. Potential Sources of the Documented Illiquidity Dynamics
The Role of Funding Constraints
Focusing on the first VAR specification at daily frequency, Figure III reports the interaction of illiquidity and funding constraints (Ted). During the recent financial crisis (Panel A), shocks to funding constraints lead to greater illiquidity in both the stock and FX markets. Moreover, funding constraints increase following an illiquidity shock in the stock market. Regarding FX illiquidity shocks, only investment currencies affect funding constraints, especially in the UK.
INSERT FIGURE III HERE]
During the dotcom bubble crisis (Panel B), funding shocks in the US affect stock illiquidity, especially of small caps, and vice-versa. Funding shocks result in greater illiquidity in all currencies, whereas only illiquidity shocks to funding currencies affect funding constraints, especially in the UK.
Finally, during the European sovereign debt crisis (Panel C), stock illiquidity (especially of small caps) increases after a funding shock, and funding constraints increase following an illiquidity shock to stocks. The relationship between FX illiquidity and funding is more complex. The illiquidity of the AUD, the CHF and the JPY declines after a US funding shock, whereas it increases following a shock to UK funding constraints. UK funding shocks trigger declines in the illiquidity of the other currencies, the EUR and the GBP. Finally, GBP and JPY illiquidity shocks reduce UK funding constraints.
Overall, funding constraints are important determinants of future liquidity in both markets. The recent financial and European debt crises are relatively more global than the dotcom crisis. Indeed, funding shocks from all systems affect stock illiquidity in the former, whereas only funding shocks from the US affect stock illiquidity during the latter. Given the role of London and New York as global currency trading centers, FX illiquidity is generally affected by funding shocks from both financial systems.
Furthermore, I find that illiquidity in both markets affects funding constraints, providing evidence for the presence of illiquidity spirals. This is in line with the theoretical models by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Acharya and Viswanathan (2011) . There is evidence of stronger linkages with small caps, which is consistent with the proposal that small caps are subject to relatively more stringent funding constraints than large caps are. Consistent with the cross-market illiquidity dynamics identified in the previous section, illiquidity spirals involve investment currencies during the recent financial crisis, whereas they are related to funding currencies during the dotcom bubble crisis. The results are consistent with the different market conditions that characterized these episodes.
At the onset of the dotcom crisis, traders were only starting to lever up and accumulate carry positions after the 1998 crisis ( Finally, there is no evidence of illiquidity spirals across markets during the European debt crisis. Indeed, this period is characterized by very large amounts of "official" liquidity created by the policy responses to the previous financial crisis and the subsequent economic crisis. In turn, the higher reliance of dealers on "official" liquidity may result in a weaker role of "private" funding constraints.
The Role of Institutional Correlated Trading
The IRFs from the second VAR specification of illiquidity and trading activity are reported in Figure IV . An unexpected increase in institutional trading triggers a greater demand for liquidity, resulting in lower liquidity levels. Indeed, stock illiquidity increases after a shock to trading activity in stocks. The illiquidity of large caps also increases due to shocks to FX trading. Furthermore, illiquidity shocks to large caps trigger greater US trading activity, whereas illiquidity shocks to small caps reduce it. Large caps are held by institutional investors that rely on their liquidity in times of distress. As a result, they are more likely to be liquidated in fire sales. Consequently, investors increase their demand for liquidity after an illiquidity shock to large caps, whereas they reduce it following a shock to small caps. Shocks to trading activity in both equity and FX trigger greater FX illiquidity, especially of investment currencies. Additionally, FX trading activity declines following an illiquidity shock to the CHF.
INSERT FIGURE IV HERE]
In conclusion, I document that the liquidity demand triggered by institutional trading negatively affects the liquidity of stocks and FX. In the stock market, investors are more likely to sell off the most liquid stocks that they hold to limit losses from fire sales. Given the lower frequency of this analysis, I cannot directly test this prediction, but the evidence for the full sample period is consistent with the fact that larger caps are likely to experience stronger demand for liquidity following illiquidity shocks (Adrian and Shin 2010; Shleifer and Vishny 2011) .
The Role of Monetary Policy
Figure V reports the responses of illiquidity in both markets to shocks to US monetary policy from the second VAR specification. Monetary policy shocks reduce stock market illiquidity.
Thus, following an unexpected increase in FED reserves, stock market liquidity improves.
There is only weak evidence with respect to FX illiquidity, whose responses are negative but insignificant.
17
17 As a robustness test, I employ the proxy for monetary policy surprises developed by Kuttner (2001) . This proxy is the difference in daily one-month Fed Fund future rates around FOMC meeting days, scaled by the proportion of days after the meeting in the month. Results are qualitatively similar and they are not reported for brevity, but they are available from the author upon request.
INSERT FIGURE V HERE]
VII. Robustness Tests
Alternative Estimation of the IRFs
There is no clear indication from theory on the causal direction of the relationship between illiquidity, volatility and funding constraints. On one hand, microstructure theory suggests that volatility affects illiquidity due to its impact on inventory costs (Stoll 1978; Ho and Stoll 1981) and asymmetric information costs (Copeland and Galai 1983; Glosten and Milgrom 1985) . On the other hand, illiquidity may lead to volatility since it exacerbates the price impact of and when the funding variables are included prior to the illiquidity variables. For the sake of brevity, I do not report these IRFs, but they are available upon request.
Alternative Funding Liquidity Measure
As a robustness test, I employ an alternative proxy for funding availability based on the amount outstanding of repurchase agreements (repos) in the US and the UK. Repos are a major source of financing for dealers. Thus, their availability captures the amount of financing that is available to them (Baklanova, Copeland and Mccaughrin 2015; Banti and Phylaktis 2015) .
Monthly data are available from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Bank of England. The responses provide additional support for the presence of illiquidity linkages between funding constraints and illiquidity. For the sake of brevity, I do not report these IRFs, but they are available upon request.
VIII. Conclusions
Illiquidity is an important channel linking the stock and FX markets. Although cross-market linkages were established between stock prices and exchange rates, this study is the first to investigate the dynamics of the illiquidity linkages between stocks and currencies.
Investigating the linkage, I find that specific asset characteristics affect the observed cross-market dynamics. On one hand, stocks of small firms are more exposed to funding constraints and exhibit stronger illiquidity linkages with currencies. On the other hand, illiquidity shocks to stocks of large firms, which are more prevalent in institutional investors' portfolios, trigger greater portfolio rebalancing and liquidity demand. Regarding FX, I show that currencies that are targets of carry trade strategies are more exposed to funding constraints and stock illiquidity shocks.
I provide support for the models by Pedersen (2009) and Acharya and Viswanathan (2011) and empirically document illiquidity spirals. Institutional investors'
trading activity and dealers' funding constraints may turn an illiquidity shock into an illiquidity spiral with systemic effects. In times of distress, an illiquidity shock may lead institutional investors to increase their liquidity demand, whereas dealers provide less liquidity. In turn, a higher demand for liquidity coupled with a decline in liquidity supply may exacerbate the illiquidity conditions, resulting in the insurgence of illiquidity spirals.
Studies on the interaction between funding and illiquidity, and those on fire sales, have mainly focused on the recent financial crisis. However, I find that the conditions for illiquidity spirals were present at the time of the dotcom bubble crisis as well. This finding suggests that the potential for destabilizing illiquidity linkages are a common feature of markets in distress.
However, there is an important exception. Indeed, I do not find evidence of illiquidity spiral conditions across markets during the European sovereign debt crisis. The provision of "official" liquidity by monetary authorities in response to the previous financial crisis may have reduced the exposure of cross-market illiquidity dynamics to "private" funding shocks.
Furthermore, there are important differences with respect to the scope of these potentially destabilizing illiquidity linkages. Possibly due to its decentralized nature, the FX market is exposed to shifts in global conditions. The analysis at a higher frequency of stock illiquidity and funding constraints suggests that the level of financial integration has increased over time, leading to more global spillovers. The dotcom crisis is a largely US-based episode with US stocks responding to shocks to US funding conditions. Conversely, in the more recent episodes, US stocks are exposed to shocks to funding constraints originating not only in the US but also in the UK. Overall, these insights on the importance of global linkages, the implications for illiquidity spirals, and the interaction with monetary policy provide a contribution to the broader discussion on global liquidity and its relevance for financial stability (IMF 2015) . in Panel C. VAR(1) are estimated according to the Schwarz criterion and include dummies, such as day of the week, month in a year and a time trend. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level. 
